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OPTIMAL BUNCHING WITHOUT OPTIMAL CONTROL
by Georg No¨ldeke and Larry Samuelson
1 Introduction
This paper considers adverse selection principal-agent models with quasi-linear utility functions
and a one-dimensional decision variable (in addition to monetary transfers). The type of the
agent is one dimensional and continuously distributed. The agent’s preferences satisfy a single-
crossing property.
When the monotonicity constraint on incentive-compatible decision functions implied by the
single crossing property binds, the optimal decision function features a bunch, i.e., there is an
interval of types choosing the same decision. In such cases, the standard analysis relies on control
theory to characterize optimal decision functions. See Jullien [10] for a general exposition.
This paper develops an alternative approach to optimal bunching. We build on an insight
due to Goldman, Leland and Sibley [8], namely that it is possible to view the principal’s problem
as choosing an optimal type assignment (mapping decisions into types) rather than as choosing
an optimal decision function (mapping types into decisions).2 Incentive compatibility imposes a
monotonicity constraint on type assignments, but the conditions under which this constraint is
binding are different from those under which the monotonicity constraint on decision functions
is binding. In particular, we show that the monotonicity constraint on type assignments can
be ignored whenever two simple conditions are satisfied. The first requires the agent’s utility
function (net of any, possibly type dependent, reservation utility) to be quasi-convex in the
agent’s type. The second requires the virtual surplus function (i.e., surplus adjusted to account
for the agent’s informational rent (Myerson [18])) to be strictly concave. As we discuss in Section
4, these conditions are satisfied in many applications of the principal-agent model, including
models of market making (cf. Biais, Martimort and Rochet [2]) and countervailing incentives
2See Wilson [24] for an extensive discussion of the assignment approach to optimal non-linear pricing and its
relation to the standard approach.
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(cf. Lewis and Sappington [12, 13]).
Because our assumptions ensure that the monotonicity constraint on type assignments is not
binding, we can obtain optimal type assignments by point-wise maximization of the appropriate
objective function. Optimal bunches correspond to the discontinuities of this point-wise solution
and may arise for two reasons. First, the point-wise solution will be discontinuous if multiple
types solve the maximization problem for a given decision. This possibility corresponds to the
cases of optimal bunching discussed in Goldman, Leland and Sibley [8] and is the only possibility
in models in which the agent’s utility is monotonic in type (cf. Baron and Myerson [1], Mussa
and Rosen [19]). Second, the point-wise solution is discontinuous if the agent’s participation
constraint is binding at an interior type (as in the models of market making and countervailing
incentives mentioned above). In either case, our approach provides a simple characterization of
the optimal bunch and also yields an alternative interpretation and derivation of the optimality
conditions customarily obtained from the application of control theory.
The following section introduces the model. Section 3 presents a reformulation of the
principal’s problem (along the lines suggested by Goldman, Leland and Sibley [8]) that provides
the starting point for our analysis. Section 4 shows how this problem can be solved by point-wise
maximization. Section 5 concludes. Some of the more technical or lengthy (steps of) proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The principal and the agent contract on a one-dimensional decision x ∈ [x, x] ≡ X ⊂ IR and a
monetary transferm ∈ IR. The agent’s utility from trade depends on her type θ ∈ [θ, θ] ≡ Θ ⊂ IR
and is given by u(x, θ)−m. The principal’s utility from trade may also depend on the agent’s
type (i.e., we allow for common values) and is given by v(x, θ) +m. The agent knows her type.
From the principal’s perspective the agent’s type is drawn from the interval Θ according to the
distribution function F , with differentiable density f > 0. The functions u and v are assumed
to be thrice continuously differentiable on X ×Θ. In addition, we assume throughout that the
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agent’s utility function satisfies the strict single-crossing property (denoting partial derivatives
by subscripts):
uxθ > 0. (1)
We formulate the principal’s problem as the non-linear pricing problem of choosing a price
function t : X → IR and an associated decision function q : Θ→ X, to solve:3
max
t,q
∫ θ
θ
[v(q(θ), θ) + t(q(θ))] f(θ)dθ (2)
subject to the incentive constraints
q(θ) ∈ argmax
x
[u(x, θ)− t(x)] , ∀θ ∈ Θ (3)
and the participation constraints4
max
x
[u(x, θ)− t(x)] ≥ 0,∀θ ∈ Θ. (4)
A solution (t, q) to this non-linear pricing problem has an optimal bunch [θ1, θ2] at x if θ1 <
θ2 and q(θ) = x holds for all types in (θ1, θ2). We are interested in obtaining a characterization
of such optimal bunches from the solution to unconstrained maximization problems. To provide
a more convenient starting point for this enterprize we reformulate the principal’s problem.
3From the taxation principle (e.g., Rochet [20]), the nonlinear pricing problem we consider is equivalent to
the familiar formulation in which the principal chooses a deterministic direct mechanism. Our assumptions (cf.
Section 4) do not preclude the possibility that the principal might fare better with a stochastic mechanism (see
Jullien [10] and Strausz [23]), replacing the set of decisions X in the deterministic mechanism with the set of
lotteries over X. It is not obvious how our reformulation of the principal’s problem in the following section could
be extended to deal with stochastic direct mechanisms, as there is no natural counterpart of the condition that
type assignments be increasing. We restrict attention to the deterministic case throughout.
4We normalize the reservation utility of every type of agent to zero. This sacrifices no generality, as we can
always interpret utilities as surpluses over a (possibly type dependent) reservation utility.
5
3 A Reformulation
As noted by Goldman, Leland and Sibley [8] for a special case of the non-linear pricing problem
introduced above, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to price functions t
satisfying5
t(x) = t(x) +
∫ x
x
ux(x˜, ψ(x˜))dx˜, ψ : X → Θ increasing, (5)
when studying the principal’s problem:
Lemma 1 Let (t, q) solve (2) - (4). Then there exists a price function t′ satisfying (5) such
that (t′, q) solves (2) - (4).
Proof: Because (t, q) satisfies (3) the associated rent function r : Θ→ IR given by
r(θ) = max
x
[u(x, θ)− t(x)] (6)
is well-defined. Define t′ : X → IR by
t′(x) = max
θ
[u(x, θ)− r(θ)], (7)
so that t′ is the lower envelope of the price functions for which (6) holds. We will first show that
(t′, q) solves (2) - (4) and then argue that it satisfies (5).
The following relationships (corresponding to the Fenchel inequalities from convex analysis,
cf. Rockafellar [22, Section 12]) are immediate from (6) and (7):
t(x) + r(θ) ≥ u(x, θ), ∀(x, θ) (8)
r(θ) + t′(x) ≥ u(x, θ), ∀(x, θ). (9)
From (8) we have t(x) ≥ maxθ[u(x, θ)− r(θ)] and thus t(x) ≥ t′(x), implying
u(q(θ), q)− t′(q(θ)) ≥ u(q(θ), θ)− t(q(θ)) = r(θ), (10)
5We say that a function ψ : X → Θ is increasing if x1 > x2 implies ψ(x1) ≥ ψ(x2).
6
and thus r(θ) ≤ maxx[u(x, θ)− t′(x)]. From (9) we have r(θ) ≥ maxx[u(x, θ)− t′(x)], and hence,
combining inequalities,
r(θ) = max
x
[u(x, θ)− t′(x)].
This implies that (t′, q) satisfies (4) and, using (10), satisfies (3). Because v(q(θ), θ) + t(q(θ)) =
v(q(θ), θ) + u(q(θ), θ)− r(θ), the principal’s profit depends on the price function only through q
and r, and it then follows that (t′, q) is optimal.
Applying Theorem 2 (in conjunction with their footnote 10) from Milgrom and Segal [17]
to t′ as defined by (7) yields the integral representation in (5), with the single crossing property
(1) implying that ψ is increasing (cf. Proposition 1 in Rochet [21]).
Throughout the following we will refer to an increasing ψ as a type assignment and say
that the pair (t, ψ) is consistent if (5) holds. The advantage of restricting the non-linear pricing
problem to price functions satisfying (5) lies in the fact that for such price functions there is
a simple characterization of the associated decision functions q satisfying (3). For every type
assignment ψ let
Ψ(x) = [lim
y↑x
ψ(y), lim
y↓x
ψ(y)], (11)
where we adopt the conventions
lim
y↑x
ψ(y) = θ, lim
y↓x
ψ(y) = θ. (12)
For any consistent (t, ψ), the corresponding decision functions q satisfying the incentive con-
straints (3) can be obtained by taking a selection from the inverse of the increasing correspon-
dence Ψ. In particular, it is optimal for type θ = ψ(x) to choose decision x when faced with the
price schedule t.
Lemma 2 Let (t, ψ) be consistent. Then
x ∈ argmax
x˘
{u(x˘, θ)− t(x˘)} ⇔ θ ∈ Ψ(x). (13)
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Proof: We have x ∈ argmaxx˘[u(x˘, θ)− t(x˘)] if and only if u(x, θ)−u(x˘, θ) ≥ t(x)− t(x˘) for all
x˘, which from (5) is equivalent to∫ x
x˘
ux(x˜, θ)dx˜ ≥
∫ x
x˘
ux(x˜, ψ(x˜))dx˜.
From (1) and the fact that ψ is increasing, this condition holds for all x˘ if and only if θ ∈ Ψ(x).
The inverse relationship established in Lemma 2 can be exploited to eliminate the decision
function from the principal’s objective (2). For consistent (t, ψ) let
G(t, ψ) =
∫ x
x
s(x, ψ(x))dx+ V (x) + t(x), (14)
where
V (x) =
∫ θ
θ
v(x, θ)f(θ)dθ, (15)
and
s(x, θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[ux(x, θ) + vx(x, θ˜)]f(θ˜)dθ˜. (16)
Lemma 3 Let (t, ψ) be consistent and let q satisfy (3). Then∫ θ
θ
[v(q(θ), θ) + t(q(θ))] f(θ)dθ = G(t, ψ).
Proof: Using (5) we can rewrite the principal’s payoff as∫ θ
θ
[v(q(θ), θ) + t(q(θ))] f(θ)dθ =
∫ θ
θ
∫ q(θ)
x
[vx(x, θ) + ux(x, ψ(x))] f(θ)dxdθ + V (x) + t(x).
Because of the inverse relationship between q and ψ (Lemma 2), we can apply Fubini’s theorem
to the double integral to obtain∫ θ
θ
∫ q(θ)
x
[vx(x, θ) + ux(x, ψ(x))] f(θ)dxdθ =
∫ x
x
∫ θ
ψ(x)
[vx(x, θ) + ux(x, ψ(x))] f(θ)dθdx.
To see the economic intuition behind (14)–(16), note that the term V (x) + t(x) corresponds to
the principal’s payoff from the contract in which every type of the agent takes the decision x
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in return for the transfer t(x). The integral appearing in (14) takes into account the additional
profits that result from providing further marginal units of x to the appropriate types of agents.
In particular, we can think of ux(x, ψ(x)) as the price charged for the x-th marginal unit, with
this marginal unit being provided (due to (1) and (13)) to all types θ˜ higher than ψ(x), resulting
in a revenue of ux(x, ψ(x))(1 − F (ψ(x))) for the principal. The principal’s cost of providing
the x-th marginal unit to type θ˜ is given by −vx(x, θ˜), yielding s(x, ψ(x)) as the profit from
providing the x-th marginal unit.
The importance of Lemma 3 is that we may reformulate the principal’s problem, as given
by (2) - (4), by first adding (5) to the constraints and then eliminating the decision function q.
The resulting program is
max
ψ,t
∫ x
x
s(x, ψ(x))dx+ V (x) + t(x) (17)
subject to
t(x) = t(x) +
∫ x
x
ux(x˜, ψ(x˜))dx˜, ψ increasing (18)
and
max
x
[u(x, θ)− t(x)] ≥ 0,∀θ ∈ Θ. (19)
In the remainder of the paper we study the problem (17) - (19). In doing so we will refer
to a price function as feasible if it satisfies (18) - (19). A consistent (t, ψ) is optimal if it solves
(17) - (19).
Throughout the following we will identify type assignments that agree almost everywhere,
thus writing ψ = ψ′ whenever ψ(x) = ψ′(x) holds for almost all x ∈ X.6 Finally, note that if
(t, ψ) is optimal, it follows from Lemma 2 that a decision function q satisfying (3) has an optimal
bunch at x if and only if Ψ(x) is non-singleton, with the optimal bunch given by Ψ(x).
6As a result, if (t, ψ) is consistent then (t, ψ′) is consistent if and only if ψ = ψ′. Our identification eliminates
spurious non-uniqueness issues which arise solely from the fact that the same price function t (which determines
the principal’s payoff) may be consistent with type assignments that are equal in the sense just defined but do
not agree for all x.
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4 Point-wise Maximization
In this section, culminating in Propositions 1 - 3, we show that two conditions suffice to determine
optimal type assignments, and thus (by Lemma 2) optimal decision functions, by solving a
collection of unconstrained maximization problems.
4.1 Assumptions
The first condition we require is
Assumption 1 The agent’s utility function u is quasi-convex in θ for all x.
Assumption 1 is (trivially) satisfied in standard applications of the principal-agent model in
which the agent’s utility is increasing in θ for all x (cf. Goldman, Leland, and Sibley [8], Maskin
and Laffont [15], and Mussa and Rosen [19]) or decreasing in θ for all x (cf. Baron and Myerson
[1]; see also Laffont and Tirole [11]). It also holds in models of (monopoly) market making, as
in Biais, Martimort and Rochet [2] (see also Glosten [6, 7]), in which 0 ∈ (x, x) corresponds to
the no-trade outcome satisfying u(0, θ) = 0 for all θ.7 Assumption 1 also holds in models with
countervailing incentives in which the agent’s reservation utility profile is concave (cf. Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare [14], who extend Lewis and Sappington [12, 13], and Feenstra and Lewis [4]).
With their analysis of the case in which the agent’s reservation profile is strictly convex, Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare [14] also provide an example of a model violating Assumption 1. Further
examples of models violating Assumption 1 are presented and analyzed in Jullien [10].8 Note
that Assumption 1 does not preclude optimal bunching. Indeed, the models of monopoly market
making and countervailing incentives cited above are among the prime examples of models in
which bunches are an essential feature of the solution to the principal’s problem.
7The single crossing property (1) then ensures that u(x, θ) is decreasing in θ for all x < 0 and increasing in θ
for all x > 0, implying Assumption 1.
8In particular, any model satisfying Jullien’s assumption of homogeneity for a non-constant quantity profile
violates Assumption 1.
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To formulate our second condition let
σ(x, θ) = v(x, θ) + u(x, θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uθ(x, θ) (20)
β(x, θ) = v(x, θ) + u(x, θ) +
F (θ)
f(θ)
uθ(x, θ). (21)
The functions σ : X × Θ → IR and β : X × Θ → IR are the virtual surplus functions (Myerson
[18]), familiar from the standard approach to the principal-agent problem.9
Assumption 2 The virtual surplus functions σ and β satisfy σxx < 0 and βxx < 0, and hence
are strictly concave in x for all θ.
Assumption 2 is commonly encountered in the analysis of principal-agent models, where its
role is to ensure uniqueness (and thus also continuity) of the decision functions qσ and qβ
that are obtained from the point-wise maximization of σ(x, θ) and β(x, θ) with respect to x.
Assumption 2 also implies that u(x, θ)+v(x, θ) is strictly concave in x for all θ, ensuring that the
decision function qFB which results from the point-wise maximization of the first-best surplus,
qFB(θ) = argmaxx u(x, θ) + v(x, θ), is uniquely defined and continuous.10 Note, however, that
qFB need not be increasing, as our assumptions impose no restriction on vxθ(x, θ). Consequently,
the model may fail to be responsive (see Guesnerie and Laffont [9]). Even in the simplest cases
in which u is either increasing in θ for all x or decreasing in θ for all x, Assumption 2 does not
preclude the occurrence of optimal bunches.11
Theorems 3 and 4 in Jullien [10] provide a complete characterization of the solution to
the principal’s problem under Assumption 2. Our analysis provides an alternative derivation
9The value σ(x, θ) is the surplus achieved by allocating quantity x to type θ, taking into account the rents that
must then be left to types higher than θ if this is to be incentive compatible. Similarly, β(x, θ) can be viewed as
the surplus from allocating quantity x to type θ, taking into account the effect on the rents of types below θ.
10Conversely, if u(x, θ)+v(x, θ) is strictly concave in x and uxxθ = 0, as is commonly the case, then Assumption
2 holds.
11To preclude bunching, qσ (resp. qβ) must be increasing, as would be guaranteed by the assumption σxθ > 0
(resp. βxθ > 0), which we do not impose.
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and characterization which, under Assumptions 1 and 2, dispenses with the optimal control
techniques that are at the heart of Jullien’s derivation.
4.2 Adapted Price Functions
As a first step in our analysis we demonstrate that Assumption 1 yields a simple characterization
of feasible price functions. In particular, feasible price functions have the property that there is
some decision xˆ such that all types of the agent obtain at least their reservation utility if they
choose xˆ and pay t(xˆ). We refer to such price schedules as being adapted.
Definition 1 Let xˆ ∈ X. A price function t is xˆ-adapted if
t(xˆ) ≤ umin(xˆ) ≡ min
θ
u(xˆ, θ). (22)
It is adapted if it is xˆ-adapted for some xˆ.
Note that every adapted price function satisfies (19). Hence, every t that satisfies (18) and is
adapted is feasible. The following lemma establishes the converse. Let
Θmin(x) = argmin
θ
u(x, θ). (23)
Lemma 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. Then every feasible price function is adapted.
Proof: Let t be feasible and let ψ be a type assignment such that (t, ψ) is consistent. Standard
fixed-point arguments (see the Appendix) imply that there exists xˆ ∈ X such that Ψ(xˆ) ∩
Θmin(xˆ) 6= ∅. Let θˆ ∈ Ψ(xˆ) ∩ Θmin(xˆ). Because θˆ ∈ Ψ(xˆ) and t is feasible, we have xˆ ∈
argmaxx[u(x, θˆ)− t(x)] ≥ 0, which implies
u(xˆ, θˆ) ≥ t(xˆ).
Because θˆ ∈ Θmin(xˆ), this inequality implies umin(xˆ) ≥ t(xˆ). Hence, t is xˆ-adapted.
Assumption 1 thus implies that we may replace the participation constraint (19) with the con-
straint that (22) holds for some xˆ ∈ X. This suggests a simple two-stage procedure for solving
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(17) - (19): in the first stage, maximize (17) subject to (18) and the additional constraint that
the price function be xˆ-adapted. In the second stage, maximize with respect to xˆ to obtain the
solution to the principal’s problem. To pursue this procedure we find it convenient to offer:
Definition 2 A pair (t, ψ) is xˆ-optimal if it maximizes (17) subject to (18) and (22).
Remark 1. The second stage of the maximization procedure described above is not needed if
there exists xˆ such that all feasible price functions are xˆ-adapted, implying that an xˆ-optimal
(t, ψ) solves the program (17) – (19). For instance, if the agent’s utility function is increasing
in θ for all x, then every feasible price function is x-adapted (because every type assignment
ψ satisfies θ ∈ Ψ(x) (cf. (12)) and θ ∈ Θmin(x) (cf. (23))). An analogous argument shows
that every feasible price schedule is x-adapted if the agent’s utility function is decreasing in θ
for all x. If u(0, θ) = 0 for all θ, as in a model of market making (see the discussion following
Assumption 1), then every feasible price function is adapted at 0. See Remark 2 (below) for
further discussion.
4.3 The First Step: xˆ-optimality
To characterize xˆ-optimal (t, ψ), define b : X ×Θ→ IR by
b(x, θ) = s(x, θ)− Vx(x)− ux(x, θ). (24)
Using the definitions of s and V given by (15)–(16) and rearranging yields
b(x, θ) = −
∫ θ
θ
[
ux(x, θ) + vx(x, θ˜)
]
f(θ˜)dθ˜. (25)
Equation (25) provides an interpretation of b analogous to the interpretation of s offered in
Section 3: b(x, θ) represents the principal’s payoff from obtaining the x-th marginal unit from
all types lower than θ at the price ux(x, θ). Condition (5) and definition (24) allow us to rewrite
the principal’s payoff (defined in (14)), for any xˆ ∈ X and any consistent (t, ψ), as
G(t, ψ) =
∫ xˆ
x
b(x, ψ(x))dx+
∫ x
xˆ
s(x, ψ(x))dx+ V (xˆ) + t(xˆ). (26)
13
It is then immediate that every xˆ-optimal (t, ψ) must satisfy (22) with equality. We may thus
eliminate the price function from the maximization problem to obtain:
Lemma 5 A consistent (t∗, ψ∗) is xˆ-optimal if and only if t∗(xˆ) = umin(xˆ) and ψ∗ solves
max
ψ increasing
∫ xˆ
x
b(x, ψ(x))dx+
∫ x
xˆ
s(x, ψ(x))dx. (27)
To identify xˆ-optimal (t, ψ) it remains to solve (27). Assumption 2 dispenses with the mono-
tonicity constraint by ensuring that the correspondences defined by
Υb(x) = argmax
θ
b(x, θ), Υs(x) = argmax
θ
s(x, θ), (28)
are increasing, i.e., every selection from these correspondences is increasing and is thus a type
assignment. Let
φb(x) = minΥb(x), φs(x) = maxΥs(x). (29)
Lemma 6 Let Assumption 2 hold. Then φb and φs are increasing. Furthermore, if ψ is a
selection from Υb (resp. from Υs) then ψ = φb (resp. ψ = φs).12
Proof: Berge’s maximum theorem ([3, Theorem 12.1]) implies that Υb and Υs are compact,
ensuring that φb and φs are well-defined. If the correspondences Υb and Υs are increasing, they
must be single-valued for almost all x ∈ X, implying that every other selection from Υb (resp.
from Υs) is an increasing type assignment equal to φb (resp. φs). It remains to show both Υb
and Υs are increasing. From Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon [16], a sufficient condition for
this is that for all (x, θ),
bxθ(x, θ) = −[uxx(x, θ) + vxx(x, θ)]f(θ)− F (θ)uxxθ(x, θ) > 0, (30)
sxθ(x, θ) = −[uxx(x, θ) + vxx(x, θ)]f(θ) + [1− F (θ)]uxxθ(x, θ) > 0. (31)
A straightforward calculation, using (21), gives bxθ(x, θ) = −βxx(x, θ)f(θ), so that condition
(30) is equivalent to βxx < 0. Similarly, from (20), sxθ(x, θ) = −σxx(x, θ)f(θ), so that condition
(31) is equivalent to σxx < 0. The result then follows from Assumption 2.
12Recall that we write ψ = ψ′ if ψ and ψ′ agree almost everywhere.
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For the cases xˆ = x and xˆ = x it is immediate from Lemma 6 that a type assignment ψ is
xˆ-optimal if and only ψ = φs, respectively ψ = φb, and can thus be obtained from the point-wise
maximization of the objective function in (27).13 For the case xˆ ∈ (x, x), an additional argument
is needed to ensure that point-wise maximization does not violate the monotonicity constraint
by inducing a downward discontinuity at xˆ. Using (1) and (24), we have
sθ(x, θ) > bθ(x, θ), ∀(x, θ), (32)
and thus
φb(x) ≤ φs(x), ∀x ∈ X,
ensuring that such a downward discontinuity cannot arise. Consequently, as we record in the
following lemma, an xˆ-optimal type assignment is uniquely determined by pasting φb and φs at
xˆ.
Lemma 7 Let Assumption 2 hold. Then a type assignment ψ is xˆ-optimal if and only if ψ = φxˆ,
where
φxˆ(x) =

φb(x), if x ≤ xˆ
φs(x), if x > xˆ.
(33)
Remark 2 For those cases in which there exists xˆ such that all feasible price schedules are
xˆ-adapted (see Remark 1), Lemma 7 finishes our task of obtaining the solution to the principal’s
problem from a point-wise maximization. To illustrate with a simple but non-trivial example,
consider a special case of the monopoly screening problem from Biais, Martimort and Rochet
[2], in which x < 0 < x, the agent’s type is distributed uniformly on [θ, θ], satisfying θ < 0 < θ,
and utility functions are given by u(x, θ) = xθ − γx2/2 and v(x, θ) = −αxθ with α ∈ (0, 1)
and γ > 0. We have noted that Assumption 1 holds and that every feasible price function is
0-adapted. Assumption 2 also holds. Thus, φ0 is the optimal type assignment. Solving the
13In addition, it is clear that assuming only σxx < 0 (only βxx < 0) suffices to obtain Lemma 6 for the case
xˆ = x (xˆ = x).
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maximization problems defining φb and φs yields the optimal type assignment
φ0(x) =

max{ θ+γx2−α , θ}, if x ≤ 0
min{ θ+γx2−α , θ}, if x > 0
Note that there is an optimal bunch at zero given by [θ/(2− α), θ/(2− α)].
4.4 The Second Step: Where to Adapt
Turning to the second step of the maximization procedure outlined above, let W : X → IR
denote the value function of the maximization problem defining xˆ-optimality. From Lemma 5
and equation (26), this is given by
W (xˆ) = max
ψ increasing
{∫ xˆ
x
b(x, ψ(x))dx+
∫ x
xˆ
s(x, ψ(x))dx
}
+ V (xˆ) + umin(xˆ). (34)
As we have already argued, Assumption 1 implies that (t, ψ) is optimal if and only if it is
x∗-optimal for x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ). Combining this observation with Lemmas 5 and 7 yields
the following:
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then a consistent (t, ψ) is optimal if and only
if there exists x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ) such that ψ = ψx∗ and t(x∗) = umin(x∗).
Proposition 1 ensures that the principal’s problem can be solved by point-wise maximiza-
tion. However, it would be desirable to have a more explicit characterization of the condition
x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ). The following result (proven in the Appendix) provides the appropriate
first order condition. Recall, from (23), Θmin(x) = argminθ u(x, θ).
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let H : X ×Θ→ IR be defined by
H(xˆ, θˆ) =
∫ xˆ
x
b(x, φb(x))dx+
∫ x
xˆ
s(x, φs(x))dx+ V (xˆ) + u(xˆ, θˆ). (35)
16
Then x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ) holds if and only if there exists θ∗ ∈ Θmin(x∗) such that
Hxˆ(x∗, θ∗)

≤ 0, if x∗ = x
= 0, if x∗ ∈ (x, x)
≥ 0, if x∗ = x.
(36)
The existence of an x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ) and hence an optimal (t∗, ψ∗) is immediate from the
(absolute) continuity of the value function W (cf. the proof of Proposition 2). Theorem 4 in
Jullien [10] shows that the optimal (t∗, ψ∗) is unique.14
4.5 Optimal Bunches
Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 imply that the solution to the principal’s problem will have an
optimal bunch at x if and only if the the optimal type assignment φx
∗
given by (33) satisfies (cf.
(11) and (12))
lim
y↑x
φx
∗
(y) < lim
y↓x
φx
∗
(y). (37)
Because φb and φs are selections from the upper-hemi-continuous argmax-correspondences Υb
and Υs (cf. (28)) and (29), we immediately obtain an explicit characterization of optimal bunches
in terms of the solutions of the point-wise maximization of b and s:15
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ). Then there is an
optimal bunch at x ∈ X if and only if (37) holds. If there is an optimal bunch [θ1(x), θ2(x)] at
14Alternatively, a straightforward (but tedious) extension of the proof of Proposition 2 establishes unique-
ness by showing that, if argmaxxˆW (xˆ) has multiple maximizers, then either the corresponding x
∗-optimal type
assignment is φb for all x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ) or is φs for all x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ).
15For the sake of clarity we state this characterization in (38) only for optimal bunches occurring at interior
decisions. The characterization of optimal bunches at the boundaries is equally straightforward from our previous
results, but requires a number of case distinctions and thus is somewhat cumbersome to state. A simple sufficient
condition to rule out bunches at x and x is given by φs(x) = θ and φb(x) = θ.
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x ∈ (x, x) it is given by
θ1(x) = minΥb(x), θ2(x) = maxΥb(x), if x < x∗
θ1(x) = minΥb(x), θ2(x) = maxΥs(x), if x = x∗
θ1(x) = minΥs(x), θ2(x) = maxΥs(x), if x > x∗.
(38)
To relate this result to existing characterizations of optimal bunches resulting from the applica-
tion of optimal control techniques, consider (first) bunches at x 6= x∗. It is immediate from (38)
that such bunches are excluded if b and s are strictly quasi-concave in θ for all x,16 as in this
case Υb and Υs are single-valued. Supposing that there is an optimal bunch at such an x, we
easily recover the result that the average of the marginal virtual surpluses over a bunch must
be equal to zero (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole [5, Appendix to Chapter 7]):
Corollary 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If [θ1, θ2] is an optimal bunch at x ∈ (x, x∗) then
∫ θ2
θ1
βx(x, θ)f(θ)dθ = 0.
If [θ1, θ2] is an optimal bunch at x ∈ (x∗, x) then
∫ θ2
θ1
σx(x, θ)f(θ)dθ = 0.
Proof: Consider the case x ∈ (x, x∗) (the other case is analogous). From the first line in (38),
we have b(x, θ1) = b(x, θ2) and thus
∫ θ2
θ1
bθ(x, θ)dθ = 0. The result is then immediate from the
identity bθ(x, θ) = −βx(x, θ)f(θ).
Consider next the characterization of optimal bunches at x∗. If we exclude the trivial special
cases in which either φb or φs is an optimal type assignment,17 then there must be an optimal
16This provides a simple alternative to the standard assumptions guaranteeing the monotonicity of qβ and qσ.
See Section 2.1 in Jullien [10].
17These cases can only occur if an optimal decision function q has the property that either q(θ) ≥ x∗ holds for
all θ or q(θ) ≤ x∗ holds for all θ. A simple sufficient condition ensuring that neither φb nor φs is optimal is that
the first-best decision function (cf. Section 4.1) qFB satisfies qFB(θ) ≤ x∗ ≤ qFB(θ).
18
bunch at x∗. Furthermore, such a bunch again satisfies (the appropriate generalization of) the
condition that the average marginal virtual surplus over the bunch must be equal to zero (cf.
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [14, Lemma 5]):
Corollary 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and suppose φx
∗ 6= φs and φx∗ 6= φb. Then x∗ ∈
(x, x) and there is an optimal bunch [θ1, θ2] at x∗. This optimal bunch satisfies∫ θ∗
θ1
βx(x∗, θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ2
θ∗
σx(x∗, θ)f(θ)dθ = 0,
for some θ∗ ∈ argminθ u(x∗, θ).
Proof: x∗ ∈ (x, x) is immediate from the assumption φx∗ 6= φs and φx∗ 6= φb. To show that
there must be an optimal bunch at x∗ it suffices to show that φb(x∗) < φs(x∗). From (32),
this must be the case unless φb(x∗) = φs(x∗) = θ or φb(x∗) = φs(x∗) = θ. Because φb and
φs are increasing, in the first of these cases we have φx
∗
= φs, while in the second we have
φx
∗
= φb. In either case we have a contradiction to the assumption φx
∗ 6= φs and φx∗ 6= φb.
Hence, there is an optimal bunch at x∗, satisfying θ1 = φb(x∗) and θ2 = φs(x∗) (from the second
line of (36) and (29)). Because x∗ is interior, (36) implies that there exists θ∗ ∈ Θmin(x∗) such
that Hx(x∗, θ∗) = 0. From (42) (in the proof of Proposition 2), this is equivalent to [b(x∗, θ1)−
b(x∗, θ∗)]− [s(x∗, θ2)−s(x∗, θ∗)] = 0. Using the identities bθ(x, θ) = −βx(x, θ)f(θ) and sθ(x, θ) =
−σx(x, θ)f(θ)dθ and integrating by parts yields [b(x∗, θ1)− b(x∗, θ∗)] =
∫ θ∗
θ1
βx(x∗, θ)f(θ)dθ and
[s(x∗, θ2)− s(x∗, θ∗)] = −
∫ θ2
θ∗ σx(x
∗, θ)f(θ)dθ and thus the result.
5 Conclusion
We have identified a class of principal-agent models in which a solution can be obtained from a
collection of unconstrained point-wise maximization problems. This characterization of optimal
type assignments has its limitations. It does not apply, for example, in cases where the agent’s
participation constraint binds at multiple, isolated types (see Maggi and Rodriguez-Claire [14]
and Jullien [10] for examples where this is the case). However, it covers a wide variety of common
cases.
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We see two promising possibilities for extending our analysis. First, as long as the agent’s
utility function is quasi-convex, Lemma 5 characterizes xˆ-optimal pairs (t, ψ). Hence, even
without strictly concave virtual surplus functions, the methods presented here allow a significant
simplification of the participation constraint.
Second, our approach provides an alternative perspective on the comparative statics of the
principal’s problem. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the solution to the principal’s problem
is determined by the point-wise solutions φb and φs and the value x∗ at which they are pasted.
The effects of changes in the underlying parameters can thus be inferred from their effect on
φb, φs, and x∗. For example, consider replacing the utility function u(x, θ) with the function
u(x, θ)− u˜(θ), for some decreasing function u˜. This corresponds to a type-dependent increase in
the agent’s reservation values. The implications are clear from Propositions 1 and 2. Since s and
b do not depend on the agent’s reservation value, this change can affect the optimal assignment
only through x∗. Since u˜ is decreasing, the set argminθ u(x, θ) in Proposition 2 must increase,
which in turn increases Hxˆ(x, θ). This ensures that x∗ must increase. As a result the optimal
decision function decreases, as the jump from φb to φs now optimally occurs at a larger decision.
We anticipate developing more such implications in future work.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4, Details: Define the correspondence L : X → IR by
L(x) = {θ − θ′ : θ ∈ Ψ(x), θ′ ∈ Θmin(x)}.
We have to show that there exists x ∈ X such that 0 ∈ L(x).
The correspondence L is convex-valued (because Ψ(x) is convex and the quasiconvexity of
u(x, θ) ensures that Θmin(x) is convex), upper hemicontinuous and compact (because Ψ is upper
hemicontinuous and compact-valued and, by Berge’s maximum theorem ([3, Theorem 12.1]), so
is Θmin). In addition, minL(x) ≤ 0 (because θ ∈ Ψ(x), from (12)) and maxL(x) ≥ 0 (because
θ ∈ Ψ(x), from (12)). Let maxL(x) < 0 and minL(x) > 0, since otherwise we immediately have
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0 ∈ L(x) or 0 ∈ L(x). Then the correspondence J defined on [x− 1, x+ 1] by
J(x) =
{
x− z
θ − θ : z ∈ L(x)
}
if x ∈ X and otherwise by
J(x) =

J(x) if x > x
J(x) if x < x
is a nonempty, compact and convex-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence from [x −
1, x+1] into itself,18 and hence by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem has a fixed point (cf. Border
[3, Corollary 15.3]). By construction, such a fixed point must occur at some xˆ ∈ (x, x) for which
0 ∈ L(xˆ).
Proof of Proposition 2: The function H given by (35) is continuously differentiable with
Hxˆ(xˆ, θˆ) = b(xˆ, φb(xˆ))− s(xˆ, φs(xˆ)) + Vx(xˆ) + ux(xˆ, θˆ). (39)
From Lemma 7, Assumption 2 implies that the value function W defined in (34) satisfies
W (xˆ) = H(xˆ, ξ(xˆ)),
where ξ : X → Θ is any selection from Θmin(x). Due to the single crossing property, ξ is
decreasing. Furthermore, W is absolutely continuous with derivative
Wxˆ(xˆ) = Hxˆ(xˆ, ξ(xˆ)) (40)
for almost all xˆ, implying that the condition (ignoring that inequality whose limit is undefined
when considering x∗ = x or x∗ = x)
lim
xˆ↑x∗
Hxˆ(xˆ, ξ(xˆ)) ≥ 0 ≥ lim
xˆ↓x∗
Hxˆ(xˆ, ξ(xˆ)) (41)
is necessary for x∗ to satisfy x∗ ∈ argmaxxˆW (xˆ). Assumption 1 implies that (41) holds if and
only if there exists θ∗ ∈ Θmin(x∗) satisfying (36).
18Note that z ∈ L(x) ensures z/(θ − θ) ∈ [−1, 1]. By assumption, maxL(x) < 0 and hence J(x) > x, and
minL(x) < 0 and hence J(x) < x.
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Next, suppose that H is pseudo-concave in xˆ for all θˆ. Because Hxˆθˆ > 0 and ξ is decreasing,
(40) would then imply the pseudo-concavity of W and thus the sufficiency of (41) for x∗ ∈
argmaxxˆW (xˆ), completing the proof.
It thus remains to show that H is pseudo-concave. Because φb ≤ φs and both of these type
assignments are increasing, for any given θˆ there exist x1 ≤ x2 such that
θˆ > φs(xˆ) ≥ φb(xˆ) if xˆ < x1
φb(xˆ) ≤ θˆ ≤ φs(xˆ) if xˆ ∈ (x1, x2)
φs(xˆ) ≥ φb(xˆ) > θˆ if xˆ > x2.
Using (24) with (x, θ) = (xˆ, φs(xˆ)), we can rewrite (39) as follows, with (1) implying the in-
equality:
Hxˆ(xˆ, θˆ) = [b(xˆ, φb(xˆ))− b(xˆ, φs(xˆ))] + [ux(xˆ, θˆ)− ux(xˆ, φs(xˆ))] > 0, ∀xˆ < x1.
An analogous argument with (x, θ) = (xˆ, φb(xˆ)) establishes
Hxˆ(xˆ, θˆ) = [s(xˆ, φb(xˆ))− s(xˆ, φs(xˆ))] + [ux(xˆ, θˆ)− ux(xˆ, φb(xˆ))] < 0, ∀xˆ > x2.
Using (24) with (x, θ) = (xˆ, θˆ), we can rewrite (39) as:
Hxˆ(xˆ, θˆ) = [b(xˆ, φb(xˆ))− b(xˆ, θˆ)]− [s(xˆ, φs(xˆ))− s(xˆ, θˆ)]. (42)
From (42) and the definitions of φb and φs, the function Hxˆ is absolutely continuous in xˆ with
derivative
Hxˆxˆ(xˆ, θˆ) = [bx(xˆ, φb(xˆ))− bx(xˆ, θˆ)]− [sx(xˆ, φs(xˆ))− sx(xˆ, θˆ)] (43)
for almost all xˆ. Because Assumption 2 implies bxθ > 0 and sxθ > 0 (cf. the proof of Lemma 6),
(43) implies Hxˆxˆ(xˆ, θˆ) ≤ 0 for xˆ ∈ (x1, x2), completing the argument establishing the pseudo-
concavity of H.
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